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The Private Sector Combats Products
Counterfeiting
I. INTRODUCTION
"Product counterfeiting is nothing less than the theft for profit of
a firm's reputation and product through the use of deception."' In
1983, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) be-
gan an investigation 2 of foreign product counterfeiting and its effects
on U.S. industries. 3  The primary goals of the investigation were:
(1) to identify U.S. industries being affected by foreign product coun-
terfeiting; (2) to measure the effects of such counterfeiting on U.S.
industry and exports; and (3) to accumulate data on the methods em-
ployed by U.S. firms to counteract this illegal activity. 4
The companies responding to USITC questionnaires stated that
generally the counterfeit items are inferior in quality as compared to
the authentic products.5 The companies complain that when an unas-
suming consumer buys a counterfeit and learns of its inferior quality,
he becomes biased against the bona fide product and its manfuac-
turer. 6 Moreover, even consumers who knowingly buy a counterfeit
because of its reduced price still expect it to be of comparable quality
to the authentic item. Once the imitation fails to meet the buyer's
expectations, his attitude towards the real product is adversely af-
fected. 7 Consequently, the consumer shies away from buying the real
product notwithstanding the fact that his experience with that prod-
1. The Effects of Foreign Product Counterfeiting on US. Industry, 82 PAT. & TRADE-
MARK REv. 471, 472 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Effects of Foreign Counterfeiting].
2. The investigation was conducted pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930 § 332(b), 19
U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1980). Effects of Foreign Counterfeiting, supra note 1, at 471.
3. Effects of Foreign Counterfeiting supra note 1, at 471.. The investigation took place
during 1983. The sources used in gathering data for the investigation included fieldwork,
private individuals and organizations, and the U.S. and foreign governments. Questionnaires
were sent to all U.S. producers believed or known to have been affected and threatened by
foreign product counterfeiting. Id. at 471-72. The major industries affected the most include:
wearing apparel and footwear; chemicals and related products; transportation parts and acces-
sories; records and tapes; sporting goods; and miscellaneous metal products, machinery and
electrical products. Id. at 476.
4. Id. at 471.
5. Id. at 482.
6. Id. at 483.
7. Id.
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uct is based on an imitation.8 Counterfeiting, therefore, adversely af-
fects the goodwill of many companies. 9 Trademarks of high-priced
items are often devalued when their corresponding counterfeits are
sold at greatly reduced prices. 10 Additionally, once the goodwill of
one product becomes tainted, a snowball effect often occurs resulting
in damage to the company's overall image and affecting other unre-
lated items it markets." American workers are also experiencing the
pains of counterfeiting. "Approximately 131,000 jobs were lost in
1982 due to foreign product counterfeiting.... 12
However, companies are fighting back. Responses to the USITC
questionnaires indicated that the money expended in detecting and
fighting product counterfeiting in 1982 totaled $12.1 million as com-
pared to $4.1 million in 1980.' 3 The companies that responded indi-
cated the following step-by-step approach to combat product
counterfeiting:
The process begins with the detection of the existence of a counter-
feit. Detection is followed by investigation into the origins and
principals of the counterfeit product and is in turn followed by at-
tempts to prevent further production. The process ends with en-
forcement action undertaken by the legitimate manufacturer or
trademark holder against the counterfeiter. Each step is dependent
upon the success of the previous step. Investigators face [a] myriad
[of] obstacles in tracing the source of counterfeits and enforcing
their trademarks. The typical counterfeiter is reported to be a
shrewd and elusive businessman, quick on the move when pursued
by a legitimate trademark owner.14
Those companies responding to the questionnaires have devel-
oped various methods to counteract product counterfeiting, such as:
private investigation by either in-house counsel or outside services;
registering trademarks with U.S. Customs; training sales forces, dis-
tributors, and licensees to detect counterfeiting in the field and at
trade shows; using anti-counterfeiting devices (electronic labeling);
registering trademarks with the appropriate authorities in foreign
countries; raising consumer awareness of product counterfeiting;
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 484.
13. Id. at 484-85.
14. The Effects of Foreign Product Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry, 82 PAT. & TRADE-
MARK REV. 518 (Dec. 1984) (continued from Nov. 1984 issue).
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working with industry associations and coalitions to promote Govern-
ment action; and maintaining full-time, in-house legal and investiga-
tive staffs.15
To enforce their legal rights, companies are also bringing civil
and criminal actions against counterfeiters and their associates, in-
cluding the middleman and the ultimate retailer. Furthermore, com-
panies issue "cease and desist" warning letters and seek judicial
search and seizure orders, police raids, and temporary restraining
orders. 16
Many companies take affirmative action against product counter-
feiting and thereby help to diminish its staggering effects on U.S. in-
dustry. However, they report that unless counterfeiting becomes less
profitable, the risks of detection increased, and the penalties made
more severe, no amount of industry action will succeed in eliminating
the problem. 
17
In fact, product counterfeiting has grown by such immense pro-
portions that counterfeiters have set up "elaborate corporate struc-
tures and sophisticated distribution systems."18 In some cases, an
illegal organization's system of production and distribution is even
more complex than that of the company whose product it is copying.
The chairman of Levi Strauss & Co. noted that his company is cur-
rently trying to dismantle "the largest and most sophisticated world-
wide ring [Levi has] discovered."' 19 Furthermore, over the past
several years, U.S. industry has seen a great change in the types of
products copied.20 Luxury items, such as expensive watches and de-
signer blue jeans, no longer stand alone as victims of this activity. A
variety of industrial, consumer, and health products are also being
copied. 21 Many of these fake products threaten the safety of the un-
witting consumer who buys the goods. 22
Consequently, the sheer magnitude and overwhelming adverse
15. Id.
16. Id. at 518-19.
17. Id.
18. Walker, A Program to Combat International Commercial Counterfeiting, 70 TRADE-
MARK REP. 117, 118 (Mar.-Apr. 1980).
19. How Levi's Cracked A Ring of Counterfeiters, Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1977, at 27 (quoting
Walter A. Haas, Jr., Chairman of Levi Strauss).
20. Kiesel, Battling the Boom in Bogus Goods, A.B.A. J., Mar., 1985, at 60.
21. See Effects of Foreign Counterfeiting, supra note 1, at 476, 482.
22. See Foltz, A Plague of Counterfeit Goods, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1984, at 68-69. G.D.
Searle had to recall over one million birth control pills when pharmacists detected irregulari-
ties in shipments of the pills they had received. Id.
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impact of product counterfeiting has made the detection and eradica-
tion of counterfeits extremely important to U.S. companies.
II. GLOBAL COUNTERFEITING
An important obstruction many companies face in detecting the
source of the counterfeit items is that product counterfeiting is no
longer centrally located. Historically, Eastern Asia was the primary
location where counterfeiters set up their manufacturing plants. East-
ern Asia is still a problem area, since the number of countries with
product counterfeiting plants in that area has made it difficult to track
down the culprits. 23 Today, many countries throughout the world
have become prime sites for producing counterfeit goods. Mexico,
Turkey and Canada contain a large number of counterfeiting facili-
ties.24 Moreover, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are all
areas in which the manufacture and sale of counterfeit goods has been
detected.
25
According to some sources, Italy is currently the largest produc-
tion center for the illegal trade in Europe,2 6 and possibly the world.
27
It is estimated that 20-25 percent of Italy's gross national product is
made up of the turnover resulting from product counterfeiting.2 8 Ac-
cording to the Rome attorney for Bausch & Lomb Inc., Italy is the
leading production and distribution center of fake Ray-Ban sun-
glasses-a trademark owned by Bausch & Lomb. 29 In view of the fact
that legitimate businesses are suffering from low investment levels,
high unit labor costs, and endless strikes,30 product counterfeiting
may well be the rason that Italy's otherwise failing economy is surviv-
ing.31 It is estimated that over 2.5 million Italians work in the facto-
ries producing counterfeit goods.32 These mini-factories "can change
their product lines the same day the owners change their minds about
23. The World War Against Phony Trademarks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15,
1979, at 52 [hereinafter cited as Phony Trademarks]. The East Asian countries with counter-
feiting plants include Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Hong
Kong.
24. Id.
25. See Effects of Foreign Counterfeiting, supra note 1, at 479.
26. Phony Trademarks, supra note 23, at 52.
27. Hansen, The Capital of Counterfeiting, DUN'S REV., Oct. 1978, at 68.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 72.
30. Id. at 70.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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what they want to make," 33 thus hindering any efforts at detection by
U.S. firms. Furthermore, Italy's unrestricted borders do not present
any threat to the illegal operators.3 4 Therefore, even if counterfeiters
are detected in Italy, they can immediately transport the fake goods to
another country for distribution.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME
The sophisticated forces behind foreign product counterfeiting
allow the counterfeiter to react quickly once he fears detection is im-
minent. Private and government investigators believe the financing
and development of counterfeiting operations is the work of organized
crime.35 Vincent M. Carratu, a former Scotland Yard detective turned
private investigator,36 claims that the chance for enormous profits is
the appealing factor which has resulted in the increased participation
by organized crime in the field of product counterfeiting. 37 The direc-
tor-general of the British phonographic industry anti-piracy squad
stated:
We have good reasons to believe that the big racketeers in
America-who are also into drugs, prostitution, and other
crimes-are also in the music business.
But the trouble is that a hasty investigation invariably results
in injunctions, writs and possibly orders to search premises-all
excellent measures to let the world know that something is being
done-but they don't identify the source of the problem.
In my experience, if you act precipitately, the trail goes cold
and the operation is driven underground until it is safe to start
again.38
IV. METHODS USED TO COMBAT PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING
A. Introduction
The aforementioned problems of detection have led many of the
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Seeger, Fake Brands: All That Glints Is Not Gucci, L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1980, at 10,
col. 2. See also Hansen, supra note 27, at 72 ("There are persistent reports of an unauthorized,
black-market factory in the Naples [Italy] area that manufactures fake Marlboro Cigarettes
without ever ... [obtaining] a license from Philip Morris, the trademark's owner.").
36. Seeger, supra note 35, at 1.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. (quoting John Deacon, director-general of the British phonographic industry anti-
piracy squad).
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larger U.S. companies to devise creative strategies to prevent and
combat product counterfeiting before investing time and money in lit-
igation. 39 Many companies feel they are being forced to take these
measures because the government is not making a strong enough ef-
fort to combat counterfeiting. 40 However, in rebuttal, government of-
ficials argue that the firms themselves are often to blame for the
alleged ineffectiveness of the government agencies. 4' They claim that
because many companies do not equip customs personnel with any
information regarding their trademarked goods, seizing the counter-
feits of those companies' products becomes virtually impossible. 42
Nevertheless, by combining the laws the government has to offer with
a firm's own ingenuity and desire to confront the problem, several
companies have recently begun to feel optimistic, or at least less pessi-
mistic, about the possible elimination and eventual decline of product
counterfeiting.
B. Hands-Off Approach
Companies have taken a stand both individually and collectively
in dealing with product cuonterfeiting. Nevertheless, there are also
many corporations who take a hands-off approach to the problem. 43
Although nonchalance does not typify the attitude of these compa-
nies, they hesitate to take overt action because of the publicity gener-
ated from investigation and resulting litigation. The fear is that any
39. See generally Rakoff and Wolff. Commercial Counterfeiting: The Inadequacy of Ex-
isting Remedies, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 493 (1983) (The article deals with the inadequacy of
various federal and state laws available to a company in its effort to combat product counter-
feiting. The authors pinpoint the problems attributable to each law and recommend specific
improvements and reconstruction of the laws to make them more effective. For instance, most
state criminal statutes merely proscribe product counterfeiting as a misdemeanor and, there-
fore, usually impose a "theoretical maximum prison term of only a few months." Id. at 523.
Additionally, since the maximum penalties are rarely imposed, the only threat of these statutes
is small fines. Their effectiveness as deterrents is therefore nominal at best.).
40. Foltz, supra note 22, at 69. Patrick O'Brien, assistant regional commissioner for U.S.
Customs in New York, stated that identifying and seizing copied items is "not [U.S. Customs']
No. 1 priority." Id. According to O'Brien, it is number four on the list behind narcotics,
technology exporting and illegal arms sales. Id. Pasquale A. Razzano, counsel for Ideal Toy
Corporation's Rubik's Cube Division, states that "our own judicial system ... has not taken
counterfeiting seriously enough and has not imposed sufficient sanctions or penalties against
the counterfeiter." Razzano, The Pragmatic Approach to Prevention of Product Counterfeiting
of Counsel for Rubik's Cube, 2 MERCHANDISING REP. 10 (Feb. 1983).
41. Foltz, supra note 22, at 69.
42. Id.
43. Kaikati and La Grace, Beware of International Brand Piracy, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 52, 58.
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adverse publicity regarding the proliferation of counterfeiting would
cause the company's customers to switch to competing brands in or-
der to avoid purchasing one of the copied products that might be in-
ferior in quality. This publicity endangers a corporation's rep-
utation. 44 According to the president of the Automotive Parts and
Accessories Association, "when the product fails to perform, the cus-
tomers blame Champion Spark Plug, AC-Delco, Ford .... They go
by the name of the product... and vow never to buy another product
from the company."' 45 He concluded that because of the fear of en-
dangered reputation, the companies disregard the fact that the prod-
uct is a counterfeit and try to do everything to satisfy a complaining
customer. 46 This includes the repair and maintenance of these less-
than-quality goods which is an added, unnecessary, and unexpected
cost to operations.
Lengthy and costly private investigations, which are needed to
acquire conclusive evidence against counterfeiters, inhibit some legiti-
mate manufacturers from pursuing their own actions against counter-
feiters.47  Additional problems facing companies threatened by
product counterfeiting include the ineffectiveness of present reme-
dies, 48 and the inherent difficulties of dealing with foreign officials and
foreign courts.49 For the past five years, Cartier, Inc. has tried unsuc-
cessfully, and with little cooperation from the Mexican courts, to
close down plants in Mexico City known to be involved in product
counterfeiting. 50 Finally, a legitimate manufacturer is faced with the
44. Moore, U.S. Firms Losing Billions to Foreign Auto Parts Counterfeiters, Automotive
News, Mar. 31, 1983, at 20, cols. 3-5.
45. Id. at 20, 48 (quoting Julian C. Morris, President of the Automotive Parts and Acces-
sories Association). See also Kiesel, supra note 20, at 61. Peter Phillips, Associate General
Counsel of Levi Strauss, stated: "There are a number of injured parties [where counterfeiting
is concerned]. The company is injured in terms of its name, its reputation and lost sales-from
the counterfeiter directly and from the consumers who got a poorly made counterfeit product
[with the company's name on it] and switches to another brand." Id.
46. Moore, supra note 44, at 48.
47. Kaikati and La Grace, supra note 43, at 58.
48. Id. See also Rakoff and Wolff, supra note 39 and accompanying text; Walker, supra
note 18, at 119.
49. Kaikati and La Grace, supra note 43, at 58. See Sheils, Swindles: Knocking It Off,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1978, at 69:
Even when the counterfeiters can be found, any crackdown on their operations is
dependent upon the sometimes Byzantine workings of local law. In Italy the Roman
police tell angry legitimate manufacturers to call paramilitary carbinieri who refer
the complaints to the Italian Ministry responsible for enforcing financial laws, who in
turn pass the buck back to the police.
Id.
50. See Sheils, supra note 49, at 69.
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risk that even if it pursues expensive investigations and litigation, it
may lose the case and be sued for malicious prosecution. 5'
Fortunately, despite these problems, many companies feel it is
important to make attempts to frustrate the operations of the counter-
feiters. The more companies assuming this task, the more effective
the effort will become in combatting the illegal practice.
C Private Investigation
Before a company decides to prosecute, it can take certain meas-
ures that will aid the litigation process or possibly even enable a com-
pany to resolve the problem prior to litigation. One such measure is
private investigation. Private investigation can be used as a warning
to future offenders. 52 It has also been the starting ground for a new
development in this area-private sting operations that have received
approval from the courts. 53 Finally, evidence gathered during an in-
vestigation can help the plaintiff present his case favorably during a
subsequent trial.
Vincent M. Carratu believes he is the only private investigator in
the world specializing in the detection of product counterfeiters. 54 His
headquarters are located in Manchester, England and he has branches
in Hong Kong and Taiwan. He operates with a work force of sev-
enty-six. 55 His job involves essentially two tasks-to locate product
counterfeiters and their places of business and to monitor markets to
detect whether fake goods are being distributed. 56 Once Carratu or
51. Kaikati and La Grace, supra note 43, at 58. See also 2 R. NORDHAUS, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT § 69(11) (1979):
When issuing an infringement notice, or filing an infringement suit, it is extremely
important that good faith be exercised. The issuance of an infringement warning, or
the filing of a suit, in bad faith-eg [sic], without any intent to implement the notice
with suit, without ascertaining prima facie infringement, or with knowledge that the
right being asserted is invalid-may subject the party asserting the right in bad faith
to liability for unfair competition or violation of the antitrust laws.
Id.
52. How Levi's Cracked a Ring of Counterfeiters, supra note 19, at 27. Regarding Levi's
recent success in exposing an international ring of counterfeiting, Chairman Walter Haas
states "it was 'particularly important to expose the large ring to discourage other imitators'
and to warn the growing number of Levi Strauss customers who are diverting their supplies to
other markets, where they are often discounted." Id.
53. See United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Musidor B.V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982).
54. Seeger, supra note 35, at 1.
55. Id.
56. Id. He simply surveys likely places known to carry fraudulent goods including dis-
count stores, open markets and street peddlers.
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one of his employees spots a counterfeit item, he pursues the ultimate
infringer. If successful, the trail will lead him from the retailer to the
distributor and to the manufacturer and, finally, to the identity of the
organizer and developer of the entire illegal scheme.57 Carratu states
that at the end of the hunt he often finds himself in Italy where many
counterfeiting factories are situated58
Anthony Hoffman, a British attorney specializing in litigation in
the area of product counterfeiting, supports the use of private investi-
gators. 59 He feels it is extremely important that once infringement is
detected, immediate measures be taken to stop any future production
and distribution of the counterfeits. 60 Such measures include thor-
ough investigation and accumulation of concrete evidence. Accord-
ing to Hoffman, the evidence an investigator gathers is often powerful
and overwhelming enough to induce the infringer to settle the case
long before the trial.6'
According to James Bikoff, President of the International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition, many large companies are investing their re-
sources into investigation departments. 62 Bikoff feels private investi-
gators play an important role in the effort to combat product
counterfeiting. 63 Because of the in-depth investigations conducted,
the product owner can "establish a prior pattern of counterfeiting
activity." 64
Levi Strauss & Co. of San Francisco is frequently the victim of
product counterfeiting. Fortunately, in September, 1977, Levi was
able to crackdown on an international counterfeiting scheme of grand
proportions. 65 Former agents from the Secret Service, FBI, and Brit-
57. Id.
58. Id. See also Hansen, supra note 27.
59. Seeger, supra note 35, at 10.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. An Interview with James Bikoff-Head of International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition,
2 MERCHANDISING REP. 4, 6 (Oct. 1983) [hereinafter cited as An Interview with James Bikoft].
63. Id.
64. Id. This strong evidence can become a very useful ingredient in a successful lawsuit
or in attempting to acquire a temporary restraining order against the counterfeiter. See infra
notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
65. How Levi's Cracked a Ring of Counterfeiters, supra note 19, at 27. Recently, Levi
Strauss & Co. was involved in a lawsuit in Indonesia against a counterfeiter who was planning
to produce 70,000 pairs of fake Levis and ship them to Holland. Kiesel, supra note 20, at 63.
The company learned of the plot through one of its sources and, by working with Netherland
authorities, was able to confiscate the first shipment made during 1983. Id. The confiscated
goods were returned to Indonesia as evidence. Id. Levi Strauss & Co., with the help of the
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ish Intelligence constituted Levi's eight-man security force. The force
traveled from the Far East, through Europe and back to San Fran-
cisco in an effort to break the worldwide network of illegal counter-
feiting. 66 The investigation resulted in five lawsuits filed in five
countries, and the arrests of the major conspirators behind the entire
operation.
67
It all began in January, 1977, when a Taiwanese businessman, a
British businessman, and an ex-Levi employee set up a company
called Levi Strauss & Co., Taiwan.68 By that time, because of Levi's
"excellent contacts in the industry, ' 69 Levi had already heard rumors
regarding the illegal operation.70 Levi's corporate security staff in-
volved in detecting this type of illegal operation costs the company in
excess of $500,000 annually.71 Thomas Nagle, a former Secret Service
counterfeiting specialist, presently serves as director of Levi's corpo-
rate security department. To perform his job more effectively, Nagle
involved himself in the manufacturing aspects of Levi's operation. In
doing so, he was able to learn exactly what to look for to identify a
fake pair of Levi jeans.72 Enlisting the aid of police departments in
various countries and using connections developed by him and his co-
workers in their prior lines of work, he established a trail that eventu-
ally led to the detection and raid of a Taiwanese plant in which 30,000
pairs of counterfeit jeans and 35,000 fake Levi components were
U.S. Embassy in Indonesia, was able to insure vigorous prosecution by the local authorities.
Id. The National Prosecutor's Office in Indonesia handled the litigation. Id.
66. How Levi's Cracked a Ring of Counterfeiters, supra note 19, at 27.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. These contacts are an essential aspect of any investigation and should be acquired
as soon as a company develops a security or investigative team. Levi Strauss & Co. receives
this "contact" information from competitors (through an informal network of information
exchange), suppliers and paid informants. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. See also Phony Trademarks, supra note 23, at 52 (Levi's Security Operations for
counterfeiting cost the corporation over one million dollars per year back in 1979.).
72. How Levi's Cracked a Ring of Counterfeiters, supra note 19, at 27. Certain elements
he looks at in determining whether a pair of Levi's is authentic are: "[T]he smoothness of the
double-arc stitching on the hip pocket, how solid the buttons are, the crispness of the gold-
over-red printing on the paper label, and the weight of the denim." Id. The imitation goods
found during the Taiwanese raid were made of lighter weight denim and the stitching material
greatly differed from that used in the real product. Id.
When a company has become a target of product counterfeiting, it should supply its inves-
tigators with samples of the legitimate product. It should also pinpoint those particulars of the
product that are hard or impossible to reproduce. Equipped with this information, investiga-
tors will find it easier to monitor the market for counterfeits.
[Vol. 8:699
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seized. 73 It also led to a " 'beautiful trail of documents' that allowed
Nagle to trace the counterfeit goods and sales through a stream of
banks, trading companies, and fictitious corporations. '74 That partic-
ular investigation cost Levi over $200,000 but Nagle's assistant felt
the money spent was worth it compared to the revenues that are lost
when counterfeiters are able to operate successfully.
75
Jordache Enterprises of New York is another apparel manufac-
turer that has been plagued by counterfeiting problems. However, ac-
cording to Jordache's general counsel Rob Spiegelman, the company
made remarkable progress in its effort to combat product counterfeit-
ing during 1983.76 Spiegelman claims that 99 percent of fake
Jordache jeans are imported into the U.S. principally from Hong
Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. 77 Detection of the imitations be-
gins with the information received from Jordache licensees, sales per-
sonnel, and several in-house investigators located through-out the
U.S.78
Spiegelman summed up Jordache's investigative system as
follows:
We have various cases started and, from these cases, we get infor-
mation regarding other sources. [The investigator] will generally
follow that up and he will also obtain new information from varous
informants, people in the security business, people from other com-
panies who come across our [products] and they find out it's coun-
terfeit, people who just call up and say "I have a pair of jeans here
and they look funny to me," that type of thing.79
Jordache's investigations have led to over eighty actions between
November, 1982 and November, 1983 and identification of over 115
defendants.8 0 Although none have actually gone to trial because of
the lack of any factual issue,8 the majority of the cases have been
73. Id. Over 78,000 counterfeit jeans have also been seized from raided locations in the
Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. An Interview with Jordache's Rob Spiegelman, 2 MERCHANDISING REP. 4 (Nov.
1983).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id. Most defendants appear in court and admit selling the items in question, but
thereafter contend that they bought the counterfeits with cash from a stranger in a flea market.
Moreover, they have a memory lapse when asked for a physical description or name of this
"stranger." Id.
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settled. 82 Spiegelman feels product counterfeiting is still a problem
for Jordache, but the company has begun to deal more effectively in
eliminating it.83 He feels counterfeiting is not as flagrant as it used to
be because the counterfeiters, aware of how aggressive Jordache and
similar companies have become in fighting the problem, are more re-
strained in their activities.8
4
1. Private sting operations and court appointment of special
federal prosecutors
The federal courts have exhibited their support of private investi-
gations by approving private sting operations.8 5 One case involved
luggage maker Louis Vuitton. In 1981, Vuitton, after bringing suit
for trademark infringement and unfair competition against Sol
Klayminc and various corporations run by Klayminc for selling fake
Louis Vuitton products,8 6 sought and won a permanent injunction
against the defendants.87
In April, 1983, Kanner Security Group, a Miami-based private
investigation firm operated by former FBI agents, contacted various
owners of prestigious trademarks, including Vuitton, with the idea of
finding and apprehending counterfeiters through a "sting" opera-
tion. 8 Vuitton agreed to the plan and appointed its attorney, Joseph
Bainton, to oversee the operation. 9 Essentially, the sting operation
involved employees of the security firm who posed as merchants inter-
ested in buying and selling counterfeits in large quantities. Two of the
operatives who played prominent roles in the operation were Gunnar
Askeland, a former FBI agent, and Melvin Weinberg, who had also
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. 734; Musidor, 658 F.2d 60; cf Gelman, A Plague of Coun-
terfeit Goods, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1984, at 70. (In addition to approving sting operations,
federal courts have granted private investigators the authority to search businesses and private
dwellings if they are able to proffer strong evidence that counterfeits are produced or stored
there. These investigators have also been given the power to seize any fakes items found).
86. Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 737.
87. Id. at 738.
88. 'Private Abscam' Trial Set in N. Y., NAT'L L.J. May 21, 1984, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter
cited as Private Abscam]; See also Attorney Could Take Part in Sting Operation Against Coun-
terfeiters, 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 129 (1984); Putting Teeth In The
Trademark Laws, Bus. WK., Oct. 8, 1984, at 79; Kohn, 'Bagscam' Case Will Offer Some 'Deja
Vu' Overtones, 191 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Deja Vu Overtones].
89. Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 738.
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participated in the "Abscam" operation of recent memory. 90
Alleged criminal contemner Nathan Helfand became the middle-
man between the defendant, Klayminc, who in 1981 consented to the
issuance of a permanent injunction,9' and Weinberg and Askeland. 92
Several meetings were held in which Klayminc and another alleged
defendant, George Cariste, established their desire to deal with Wein-
berg and Askeland. 93 Before the final meeting, Bainton moved the
Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York to ap-
point himself and co-counsel Robert Devlin as special Federal Prose-
cutors94 under rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.9" Bainton also requested that he and Devlin be allowed to
"continue the investigation and, in due course, the prosecution of
what appear[ed] to be a massive international conspiracy to violate
[the] Court's permanent injunction. '96
According to one of the affidavits filed by Bainton, Klayminc
planned on establishing a factory in Haiti to produce counterfeit Vuit-
ton bags in which Klayminc could potentially net almost $38 million
a year in profit.9
7
Weinberg's tactics, similar to those used during the Abscam op-
eration,98 included enticing Klayminc into a deal whereby Weinberg
would lead Klayminc to believe that he (Weinberg) would be able to
arrange financing for the Haitian project. 99
Bainton informed the court that based on the assumption that
the court would grant his applications, he had Weinberg set up a
meeting between Askeland, Klayminc and Weinberg for April 5,
1983, in New York City which was to be video-taped for evidentiary
purposes. 100
In its Order, the court granted the appointments of Bainton and
90. Id.
91. Id. at 737.
92. Id. See also Deja Vu Overtones, supra note 88, at 2.
93. Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 738.
94. Id.
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). The rule states in pertinent part: "A criminal contempt...
shall be prosecuted on notice .... The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court
in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the U.S. Attorney or of an attorney
appointed by the Court for that purpose . (emphasis added).
96. Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 738.
97. Private Abscam, supra note 88, at 44.
98. Id. In Abscam, Weinberg offered former New Jersey Senator Harrison Williams, Jr.
financing for a titanium mine. Id.
99. Id.
100. Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 738.
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Devlin to investigate and eventually prosecute the action.' 0 After the
Order was handed down, Bainton's investigation produced several
video and audio recordings involving conversations held between the
alleged contemners and the investigation team. 10 2 Based on these re-
cordings, the court issued an Order to Show Cause for Civil and
Criminal Contempt against Klayminc, his son and four other defend-
ants. 0 3 The court ordered the seizure of the counterfeit Vuitton items
as well as the equipment and promotional materials used for the man-
ufacture and distribution of the counterfeits. 1°4
The defendants made numerous pre-trial motions including the
Motion to Revoke the Special Prosecutors' Appointments. 105 The
court denied defendants' motions and specifically upheld the appoint-
ments. 0 6 The defendants contended that Bainton and Devlin behaved
improperly in supervising the video and audio-taped meetings.
0 7
Further, they maintained that Bainton and Devlin should not enjoy
immunity from state regulations concerning illegal wiretapping be-
cause that immunity is extended to individual federal government
agents when performing their respective duties. 08 They based this
contention on the grounds that since Bainton and Devlin were com-
pensated by a private party, and not by the government, they should
therefore not be raised to the status of a federal agent. 10 9
The court, in rejecting this argument, stated that once Bainton" 0
was appointed special prosecutor, he was "protected by the same im-
101. Id. at 739.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The Court based its approval of the appointments on the rationale of two New York
cases: "'Criminal prosecutions ... are prosecuted either by the United States or by the Court
to assert its authority.... [As to the latter], the judge may prefer to use the attorney of a party,
who will indeed ordinarily be his only means of information when the contempt is not in his
presence.'" Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 739-40 (quoting McCann v. New York Stock Exchange,
80 F.2d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1935)).
Neither Rule 42 [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] nor the Due Process Clause
requires the Court to select counsel from the staff of the United States Attorney to
prosecute a criminal contempt. The practicalities of the situation-when the crimi-
nal contempt occurs outside the presence of the Court but in civil litigation-require
that the Court be permitted to appoint counsel for the opposing party to prosecute
the contempt ....
Id. at 740 (quoting Musidor, 658 F.2d at 65).
107. Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 747-48.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 748.
110. It is assumed that the court was referring to Devlin as well.
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munity that federal officials enjoy in carrying out their duties, regard-
less of the source of his compensation."
'11 I
The defendants also contended that Bainton and Devlin should
be disqualified because of their purported pecuniary interests in the
matter and resulting inability to be objective prosecutors.1 12 The
court rejected this argument as well, stating that if it disqualified
counsel on this basis, it would have to do so in every trademark case
in which a civil plaintiff's attorney seeks injunctive relief against a
defendant since those cases are also financed by civil clients.' 13
In response to defendants' various due process arguments, the
court assured them that throughout all future proceedings, they
would be afforded the same procedural protections due them as other
criminal defendants and that the appointments of Bainton and Devlin
as special prosecutors would not give them "any letters of marque or
reprisal against the defendants."
' 1 4
This sting operation and others like it have elicited strong criti-
cism from the defense bar. An attorney with Washington Square
Legal Services who represented Klayminc's son in Vuitton felt these
private investigations pose serious problems.' ' He stated: "We just
can't have cowboys, which is essentially what these people [such as
Weinberg] are, running around and doing these kinds of things." 116
Moreover, he claimed that Weinberg was permitted to conduct the
sting operation in a way that no government employee would be per-
mitted to do.' 17 He alleged that during one of the video-taped meet-
ings, Weinberg advised one of the defendants to refrain from
informing his lawyer about the meetings he was attending." 8
Lawyers for defendants in a case in which a sting operation was
conducted involving Polo of Warner/Lauren, Ltd., similarly argue
that these criminal contempt prosecutions "set a dangerous precedent
by allowing lawyers for interested parties to fill the prosecutor's role
111. Vuitton, 592 F. Supp. at 748.
112. Id. at 745-46. Defendants argued that because Vuitton bankrolled the litigation and
Bainton's fees, it was highly likely that his behavior would be totally subjective and that he
would disregard the prosecutor's duty to be objective. Id.
113. Id. at 746.
114. Id.
115. Private Abscam, supra note 88, at 3 (quoting James A. Cohen, an attorney with Wash-
ington Square Legal Services).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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normally reserved for a government lawyer.1 19 They contended that
in theory the prosecutor's job is not one for personal gain or to only
seek conviction, but to insure that justice is furthered. 120 These crit-
ics, therefore, question whether counsel for private clients, when ap-
pointed special prosecutor, will strive to accomplish these goals.
121
Attorneys for Vuitton and Polo responded that:
[T]hey are well aware of their special obligations to the defendants.
But each also acknowledges that the news of counterfeiters facing
incarceration, the only punishment that may be meaningful to
them, could be invaluable to trademark owners. Counterfeiters,
says Bainton, [Vuitton's attorney] 'are folks who, as a general rule
find the thought of going to jail abhorrent.'
122
Regardless of the criticism concerning private investigation and
sting operations, they appear to be beneficial tools for a company to
utilize in warning counterfeiters of the probable consequences of their
future illegal activity and to thwart present counterfeiting operations.
2. Evidence gathered during private investigations
Evidence gathered during private investigations often turns out
to be the deciding factor during trial.123 According to Pasquale Raz-
zano, counsel for Ideal Toy Corporation, complete preparation, in-
119. Putting Teeth In The Trademark Laws, supra note 88, at 79.
120. Id.
121. Id. Again, it is important to note that it is the corporate client, and not the govern-
ment, who is compensating the private attorney/special prosecutor and whose goal is not nec-
essarily to promote justice but is more compatible with seeking severe penalties and
incarceration for the trademark infringers.
122. Id.
123. 8 AM. JUR. TRIALS Trademark Infringement § 15 (1965).
With the intentional, malicious infringer, preliminary strategy is of critical impor-
tance .... [T]he efforts of plaintiffs counsel should be directed mainly to the impor-
tant task of accumulating evidence. Where the defendant has intentionally sought to
infringe, plaintiff's investigation may uncover, through unguarded statements by de-
fendant or its sales representatives, evidence of actual consumer confusion and of
malice or palming off.
It is of critical importance to plaintiff's case to collect such evidence as early as
possible. Where there is consumer confusion initially, it frequently diminishes and
may ultimately disappear within a few months, because purchasers tend to become
educated as to the respective products. Furthermore, where defendant is making
false representations in palming off its products as those of plaintiff, these representa-
tions may become more guarded and less susceptible to discovery once defendant is
warned by a notice of infringement. Therefore, the best policy for plaintiff is to avoid
pointless discussions with an unscrupulous defendant and collect evidence for use in
litigation.
Early investigative efforts have another advantage. One of the most effective
techniques available to plaintiff's counsel is to follow the filing of its complaint with a
well-documented motion for a preliminary injunction. Evidence of intentional mis-
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cluding collection of all essential facts, is mandatory before entering
the courtroom. 124 Razzano states that this information will help in
determining: "(1) the nature and magnitude of the offense; (2) the
identities of fall] responsible individuals; (3) the scope of the opera-
tions; and (4) the relations between potential defendants."1 25 He ad-
vises that a company should acquire all the financial data it can
concerning all potential defendants and try to discover whether these
individuals or entities have been involved in any other trademark in-
fringement suits or similar actions. 126 Razzano states:
A good investigator can find out incredible amounts of information
in a short time that an attorney might take months to develop by
discovery. Investigators can be used to make purchases of counter-
feit products for use as evidence and they can serve as unbiased
witnesses. They should be sent to tradeshows to investigate what
wholesalers or distributors are importing and selling. Using their
experience and guile, they will be able to befriend potential defend-
ants and gain information about companies further up the chain of
distribution which might otherwise be impossible to obtain from
the typical purveyor of counterfeit merchandise whose litany to
lawyers and judges alike is 'I bought for cash from a peddler I
never saw before whose name I don't remember. ' 127
Other measures that Razzano recommends a company undertake
before trial include the following: checking the records of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office to determine whether the defendants
hold any trademark registrations or patents; 28 setting up "sting" op-
erations to penetrate the counterfeiter's operations; preparing for any
potential counterclaims (e.g., antitrust violations); and cease and de-
sist letters. 129 Razzano concludes that the perception a court receives
conduct presented in support of such a motion can be overwhelming to the defendant
and may well result in immediate capitulation.
As soon as an effective program of investigation has been completed (preferably,
a period not to exceed a month), plaintiff may either send a notice of infringement or
file suit without warning. If a notice is sent, it should be followed within a few days
with a request for a personal conference. Partial disclosure of the results of plaintiffs
meticulous investigation is often very effective in such a conference, but, if early co-
operation is not received from defendant, plaintiff should promptly file its complaint
and should not be drawn into pointless and time-consuming negotiations.
Id. at 387-88.
124. Razzano, supra note 40, at 12.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 12-13. See supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
128. Razzano, supra note 40, at 13. However unlikely it is, some defendants may hold
prior rights to the trademark and counterclaim infringement by the plaintiff. Id.
129. Id. However, many infringers are not threatened by such letters and once warned,
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concerning the trademark owner's view of the case, including confi-
dence in one's claims and reasonableness of the relief sought-all es-
tablished by laying a concrete foundation of highly probative
evidence-permeates product counterfeiting cases more than most
other types of lawsuits. 130 He states: "[T]he law in this field is in such
flux that each case is truly sui generis and the perceptions conveyed to
the court may be more important than the actual status of the law."131
Thus, investigative techniques, whether conducted by attorneys or
specialists, and by whatever means appropriate for the particualr situ-
ation, are vital to the company that desires success in its effort to
combat product counterfeiting.
132
D. Modern Technology
In conjunction with conducting private investigations, owners of
trademarks and patents tackle the problem of counterfeiting by using
modern technological devices to determine whether a product is genu-
ine or not. 133 An optical system called "Confirm," designed by 3M
Corporation, uses a label which contains a hidden logo that can only
be seen under a special viewer. 134 Under the special light, if the hid-
den symbol does not appear, the viewer knows he has obtained a
counterfeit product. 135 "Polarproof' is an optical system developed
by Polaroid in which a "lenticular lens system is inserted into the
label.' 1 36 The authenticity of the item is revealed if the logo changes
will destroy the counterfeit goods and all records, if any, concerning them. Hence, cease and
desist letters might be counterproductive if they result in the destruction of good evidence.
Further, the letter might put the counterfeiter on notice whereby he can simply change one
minor aspect of the product and make it different from the genuine product. He will thus
"succeed in changing a clear infringement into a legally debatable one which can be even more
dangerous to plaintiff's ultimate chance of success." Id.
130. Id. at 14.
131. Id.
132. See 8 AM. JUR. TRIALS Trademark Infringement §§ 4-5 (1965) (The authors set out
an excellent checklist for a potential plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit to follow in
compiling evidence for trial.); R. NORDHAUS, supra note 51, §§ 69-70. (The author gives an
informative overview of specific measures a company should undertake during its investigation
phase of litigation.); An Interview With James Bikoff, supra note 62, at 5-8. (Bikoff, President
of the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, outlines procedures to be followed during
an investigation and the type of evidence to be acquired).
133. An Interview With James Bikoff, supra note 62, at 6.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. See also Kiesel, supra note 20, at 63. The Chicago Transit Authority spends
approximately five thousand dollars each month to use the Polarproof process on its commut-
ing passes. Id.
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color when the product label is rotated.1 37 "Fingerprinting" is an-
other process that is often used. Light Signatures, a Los Angeles elec-
tronics company, "uses a laser to scan the fibers in a specific portion
of each product; the patterns (uniquely different for each) are re-
corded in a computer."1 38 This process enables the user to track the
distribution network of a counterfeit good from the manufacturer all
the way to the consumer.1 39 Other systems include the use of heat
and labels containing magnetic fibers that can be detected by a
magnet. 140
These ingenious technological devices have been specifically de-
veloped in response to the increasing problem of product counterfeit-
ing.1 41 If a patent or trademark owner institutes one of these systems
into its manufacturing process, that alone is a positive step towards
alleviating the problem. The use of technology, although not a cure-
all, can, like private investigations, be used as a warning to counter-
feiters that their activities and the products they produce can be easily
detected, as well as provide the means for such detection.
E. Use of Advertising
Some companies faced with product counterfeiting employ ad-
vertising to either warn the consumer or build prestige for its product
or trademark.1 42 Apart from prosecuting, Louis Vuitton withdrew its
often copied line of plastic Louis Vuitton "Speedy" travel bags from
the Italian market. 43 The purpose for withdrawal was to turn the
counterfeiting problem into an "image builder"; its campaign read:
"Louis Vuitton is at least as upset as you are that such a bag won't be
sold anymore in Italy. But Louis Vuitton is as sure as you are that
those who buy his luggage want, above all, an exclusive article."'
44
Other companies such as Cartier, Inc. have informed the public
137. An Interview With James Bikoff, supra note 62, at 6.
138. Foltz, supra note 22, at 70. Ocean Pacific Sunwear uses this process. Id. See also
Kiesel, supra note 20, at 63; Dobson, Light Signatures-A Technological Approach to Combat-
ting Counterfeiting, 2 MERCHANDISING REP. 9 (Oct. 1983). This article deals specifically with
Light Signature's technique, its value to companies faced with the problem of counterfeiting,
and specific companies that have used the device and their success with it.
139. An Interview with James Bikoff, supra note 62, at 6.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Kaikati and La Grace, supra note 43, at 58.
143. Id.
144. Id. No other company has ever gone this far, probably because of the drastic effect of
a withdrawal on all phases of the corporation's operations.
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to beware of counterfeits and at what stores they can purchase genu-
ine Cartier products.145 Another approach, taken by Harley-David-
son and Dr. Scholl's, uses flattery in advertising campaigns to make
light of the problem. 146
F. International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition
Finally, along with the many strategies a company can employ to
combat product counterfeiting, it is useful to be a part of trade as-
sociations or coalitions to receive and exchange valuable information
and to participate in a supportive group that is striving to achieve the
same goals. One such group is the International Anti-Counterfeiting
Coalition (IACC). According to IACC President James Bikoff, the
Coalition has three major goals:
The first is to seek both domestic and international legislation and
regulations, and their enforcement in order to curtail counterfeit-
ing. Secondly, in the area of information exchange, it serves as a
facility for members to exchange information on their experiences
and to help each other fight the problem. The third goal is educa-
tion and representation of the interests of the consumer. We try to
educate the trade and consuming public to make them aware of the
economic and safety risks associated with commercial counterfeit-
ing with the aim of helping them to avoid the unintentional
purchase of counterfeit products. 14 7
The Coalition's membership includes The Coca Cola Co., Levi
Strauss & Co., Cartier, Inc., Atari, Inc., Polaroid Corp., IBM Corp.,
Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., Procter & Gamble Co., Sam-
sonite Corp., and Walt Disney Productions. 48
Because litigation is not always effective in abrogating the prob-
lem,149 one of the chief priorities of the Coalition is to lobby for new
legislation that will stiffen civil and criminal penalties and, in turn,
provide stronger incentives to refrain from counterfeiting. 50 Further,
145. Id. See also How To Avoid The Dangers Of Counterfeit Auto Parts, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 17.
146. Kaikati and La Grace, supra note 43, at 58. The Harley-Davidson Division of AMF
Corp. in advertisements promoting one of its motorcycles proclaims: "Harley-Davidson gives
the competition yet another chance to imitate." Id. Dr. Scholl's advertisements for its sandals
read: "Once you climb to a Dr. Scholl's, you will never sink to an imitation." Id.
147. An Interview With James Bikoff, supra note 62, at 4.
148. Trigoboff, Corporate Coalition Wages War On Counterfeiters, Legal Times, Feb. 6,
1984, at 2, col. 1.
149. Id. at col. 3.
150. Id.
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the Coalition encourages its members to put pressure on the retailer
who is known to sell counterfeit goods.15" ' According to Norman
Adise of JCA Corp., the retailer is the weak link in the counterfeiting
chain. 5 2 Adise's "nice guy" approach includes informing the retailer
that his merchandise is counterfeit and permitting him to cooperate
and surrender what he has.153 Adise states: "Strip the retailer of his
traditional defense, the claim of innocence . . . and he stands fully
available to penalties. Threat of imposition can produce much; in-
cluding disclosure of the chain and identification of the next higher
level, the distributor."'
154
V. CONCLUSION
Foreign product counterfeiting is an enormous headache for
many trademark owners who have expended a great deal of time,
money, and effort to create and market a unique product and then
have to share the benefits of their hard labor with elusive and unscru-
pulous counterfeiters. Furthermore, counterfeiting would not be so
successful if there were not a market for cheap, imitation goods.
Bikoff claims that "[p]eople are hungry for bargains and are much
more tempted to buy them at times, like now, when money is
tight." 55 And Adise concedes:
a 'grudging admiration' for the counterfeiter, who is, he [admits],
'an intelligent being and has the highest admiration for you and
your company. Why not? He makes his living... a damned good
one at that ... from your brand, product design, your advertising
and reputation. Whether he has a similar respect for your an-
ticounterfeiting program pretty much depends on the extent and
vigor of your efforts to impose hardship upon him personally."5 6
Companies are attacking the counterfeiters on three levels. First,
they are going after counterfeiters directly through court action. Sec-
ond, they are lobbying for more stringent laws and enforcement. Fi-
nally, they have chosen to use their own private resources to curtail
product counterfeiting as opposed to awaiting successful action by the
government. As more companies become involved, and the network
within the private sector gains strength, it should become harder for
151. Id. at col. 4.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Kiesel, supra note 20, at 63.
156. Trigoboff, supra note 148, at 2, col. 4 (emphasis added).
1986]
720 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 8:699
counterfeiters to operate without detection and reprisal. The ultimate
winners in this private battle against counterfeiters are not only the
manufactuers, but consumers as well.
Barbara Jo Ehrlich
